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IN THE StJPRn.m COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAR
~TE

OF UTAH, in the interest
Orgill and Bart
)rgill, persons under 18
years of age,

or Evan

Case No. 15140

v.
JOYCE THOMASON,

Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

********************
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
A petition was filed in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County
seeking to deprive the Appellant, natural mother of Evan Orgill and
~rt Orgill,

of her parental rights pursuant to the provisions of

5H0-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as emended.
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable John Farr Larson, Juvenile

Court Judge, Salt Lake County Juvenile Court, who entered an Order
leprinng the Appellant, Joyce Thomason, of her rights as the natural
:arent of Evan Orgill and Bart Orgill.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Joyce Thomason, seeks a reversal of' the Order
of' the Juvenile Court and recovery of' her costs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, Joyce Thomason, and Leonard Orgill are the natural
parents of Evan Orgill, born March
January 4, 1971.

8, 1967, and Bart Orgill, born

Joyce and Leonard are also the natural parents of thm

other children, Joslyn Orgill, born November 12, 1957, Bryan Lee Orgill,
born July 18, 1960, and LaRue Orgill, born October 2, 1962, which three
children are not involved in this appeal.
Joyce and Leonard were married, divorced, remarried and again
divorced, with Joyce having custody of the five (5) children of' the
marriage (Exhibit K, R-222).
Appellant married her present husband, Kenneth Thomason, July 6,
1973 (R-155).

After her marriage to Kenneth Thomason, the Appellant

and her five (5) children lived with him (Kenneth Thomason), receiving
public assistance, until February, 1974 (R-156 and 157).

Financial presiu:'
I

a drinking husband, contacts by her ex-husband and difficulties in contro~
her children, resulted in the Appellant's voluntary placement of her five
(5) children with the Division of' Family Services (R-156, 157, 158, i6 4,
and 165).
Evan and Bart were placed in the same foster home, but in a separs:e
foster heme from the other three (3) Orgill children.

Visitation vith
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I

aooellant 's children was arranged through the childrens' case worker.
The record discloses only two (2) visits between appellant and Evan
and Bart between February, 1974 and July, 1974, when appellant followed

her husband to Denver, Colorado to make a home ( R-158 and 160) .

After

leaving Salt Lake City, in July, 1976, to live in Denver, appellant has
had

no further visitation with Evan and Bart.
In the latter part of October, 1974, a new foster care case worker

vas substituted for the original foster care case worker (R-83 and 84).
Appellant returned to Salt Lake City from Denver, and in a visit with the
new foster care case worker on December 17, 1974, requested visitation
vi.th her (Appellant's) children (R-85 and 86).

Apellant's visitation

vith the three (3) older children was granted, but was not allowed with
Evan and Bart (R-86).

Appellant vas in Salt Lake City from July 28, 1975

to August 5, 1975, visited with the three (3) older children, but did not
visit with Evan and Bart, since they wer.e not in tovn and appellant had

not advised the foster care case worker ahead of time that appellant would
be in Salt Lake City.
On February 9, 1976, the foster care case worker wrote to appellant
concerning appellant ' s interest in the children of appellant ( Exhibit I) .
A reply to the foster care case worker's letter of February 9, 1976 was made
by appellant in a letter dated February 14, 1976 (Exhibit J) in which

expression was made by appellant and her husband to regain custody of
appellant's children.
On August 18, 1976, a Petition was filed by the foster care case worker
of Evan and Bart (R-265), which Petition was modified by a Pre-Trial motion
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and Order :f'or a more definate statement (R-255), seeking to deprive
appellant of her parental rights in Evan and Bart pursuant to the provis:::
of 55-10-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
ARGUMENT
Point I

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT EVAN ORGILL A.ND BART
ORGILL CAME WITHIN THE PROVISIONS
OF 55-10-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
AS AMENDED.
The Petition to deprive appellant of her rights as the natural parer.:
of Evan Orgill and Bart Orgill was made pursuant to the provisions of
55-10-109 (l) (a.) (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended which provides
"(l)

The court may decree a termination of all parental
rights with respect to one or both parents if the
Court finds:
(a)

That the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent
by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental
to the child; or

(b)

That the parent or parents have abandoned the child.
It shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment that
the parent.or parents, although having legal custody
of the child, have surrendered physical custody of
the child, and for a period of six months following
such surrender have not manifested to the child or to
the person having physical custody of the child a
firm intention to resume physical custody or to make
arrangements for the care of the child."

Does the evidence disclose an abandonment of Evan and Bart by the
Appellant?
This Court in The State of Utah, In the Interest Of Summers ChEdr__!.S
v. Orin John Wulffenstein, 560 P2d 331, cited 'With approval the construe:.-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

I
I

of the term "abandonment'' as expressed by the Supreme Court of Alaska in
the case of In The Matter Of D. M. , a Minor v. State of Alaska, 515 P2d
~234,

and further refined by The Alaska Supreme Court in the case of

~n The Matter Of B. J. , a Minor, 530 P 2d 74 7, wherein the Alaska Court

stated "an abandonment finding cannot be predicated solely on the best
interest of the child . • . the test for abandonment is whether there is
conduct on the part of the parent which implies a conscious disregard of
the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of
the parent-child relationship.

The test focuses on two questions -

has the

parent's conduct evidenced a disregard for his parental obligations, and
has that disregard led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship?

The best interests of the child are relevant to the latter question,
because it is indicative of a breakdown of the parent-child relationship

if the child's best interests are promoted by legal severance of the relation.
But the child's best interests may not always be directly relevant to the
parent's disregard of his obligations.

This part of the test can only

be satisfied by proof that the parent's conduct evidences a conscious
disregard of his obligations".
In relation to the foregoing determination of the elements of abandonment,
lets examine the evidence as it relates to the appellant and her conduct toward
Evan and Bart.

It would seem that it was concern for, rather than a dis-

regard for, the well being of her children that prompted appellant's
7

olunte.ry placement of her five (5) children with the .Jlivision of Family

Semces.

Appellant was asking for help for her family (R-157, 158 and 164) •
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but was in effect left to her own devices.
Two visits ri th Evan and Be.rt was the extent of appellant's contac:
with those two children from February, 1974, when appellant placed her
children with the Division of Family Services, to July, 1974, vhen S]l'pe.La:·
moved to Denver to join her husband.

Yet, the record does not show one

instance in which appellant did not make an attempt to visit Evan and Bar.
during the times when she was in Salt Lake City.

And if the Juvenile Coi;r.

is counting the times when appellant vas in Salt Lake City attending the
trial of this case as among the "six to eight" times appellant visited
Salt Lake City since her move to Colorado, as recited in its Findings

o~ ,,:-j

then, the Juvenile Court should count tvo more refUsals of appellant's
request to visit Evan and Bart -- once vhen she appeared at trial in
December, 1976 and again when she appeared at trial in February, 1977.
The record reeks with frustrations of appellant's efforts to be reunited with her children -- the letter of September 6, 1974 (Exhibit C)
which would seem to imply that appellant could not get her children and
remain in Colorado with her husband -- appellant's letter of October 17'

1974 (Exhibit D) and the reply letter (Exhibit F).
As set forth in 55-10-63., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the '
very existence of the Juvenile Court Act is predicated "to secure for eac:
child coming before the Juvenile Court such care, guidance, and control,
preferably in his own home, as will serve his velfare and the best intm'
of the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties vhenever possible;
• • • To this end this Act shall be liberally construed."

If the foregc'.:' I

I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

I

statute means vhat it vould seem to say, the Juvenile Court system has
a responsibility in making it possible for the appellant and her children
to be together as a family.

Yet, no affirmative steps vere taken to reunite

aupellant vi th her children.
Another stone is cast at the appellant by the finding of the Juvenile
Court that appellant had not supported her children although she had been
employed since October, 1974.

But there is nothing in the evidence of

appellant's ability to support, and certainly the Juvenile Court made no
order of support in exercising its powers under 55-10-110, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Point II

THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING
THAT APPELLANT IS UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT
BY REASON OF CONDUCT OR CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY
DETRIMENTAL TO EVAN Al!D BART.
Linea Bowles, foster care case worker who came into the case after
appellant moved to Colorado, filed the Petition to deprive appellant of her
(appellant's) parental rights with Evan and Bart (R-265).
vas filed August 18, 1976.

The Petition

How Miss Bowles, having only met vith appellant

on tvo occasions prior to August 18, 1976 (R-85, 89 and 90), had the
qualifications to make the allegation set forth in the Petition, as tempered
~YA More Definite Statement (R-255) is still a mystery to this writer and

:s certainly made no clearer by the record.
This Court in the case of State of Utah, In The Interest Of Ricley Win~er,
558 P 2d 1311, held that to sustain an order terminating the parent-child
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relationship, the court must be convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that the conduct or condition is seriously detrimental in its
effect on the child.
In the instant case, no shoving is made in the evidence that there
is any causal connection between any detrimental effect on Evan and Bart
by conduct or condition of the appellant.
CONCLUSION
The appellant voluntarily sought the help of Utah's Juvenile Court
system for a helping hand vith a family situation vith which appellant
was finding it difficult to cope.

Rather than extending a helping hand

to appellant, the Juvenile Court system burdened appellant vi th more
frustrations vith barriers which were placed between appellant and a
parent-child relationship with her two youngest children, Evan and Bart.
Appellant was never reunited with Evan and Bart in a parent-child
relationship, after she placed them into the Juvenile Court system in
February, 1974.

Then, after trial upon a Petition to deprive appellant

of her rights as the natural parent of Evan and Bart, in which the evidew
did not sustain the allegations of the Petition, the Juvenile Court
deprived appellant of her parental rights vith Evan and Bart and, in
effect, gave its (Juvenile Court's) blessing upon the break up of a

ram::,·

to which the Juvenile Court system had made a significant contribution
by failure to discharge its responsibilities.
The Juvenile Court should be reversed, and appellant's parental
rights vi th Evan and Bart restored.

Costs should be awarded to appe~la.i::.

I
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Respectfully submitted,

DON BLACKHAM
BLACKHAM AND BOLEY
Attorneys for appellant
3535 South 3200 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Phone 968-8282 or 968-3501
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